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Innate and Discretionary Accrual Quality and Corporate Governance 
 
Pamela Kent* 
James Routledge* 
Jenny Stewart** 
 
* School of Business, Bond University 
** Griffith Business School, Griffith University 
 
 
The empirical analysis presented in this paper provides further insight into the important 
issue of the association between corporate governance structures and the quality of reported 
company earnings. The analysis uses the measure of accrual quality developed by Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) which provides a direct measure of the quality of current accruals. We 
derive measures of the innate and discretionary components of accrual quality following 
Francis et al. (2005), and subsequently include these measures in regressions against 
corporate governance characteristics. The results show that sound governance structures have 
a positive association between the innate and discretionary components of accrual quality. 
Interestingly, we find the relation between sound governance structures and accrual quality is 
stronger for innate than discretionary accruals. This suggests that sound governance is more 
important in reducing environmental uncertainty and associated unintentional accrual 
estimation errors than in constraining discretionary earnings management. 
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1. Introduction 
The association between corporate governance structures on the quality of financial statement 
information has been the subject of a substantial body of research. Within this research, 
particular emphasis has been given to assessing the relation between governance and earnings 
management or manipulation. Overall, prior studies have shown that governance mechanisms 
play an important monitoring role, and that stronger governance structures reduce the 
likelihood of earnings management. While there is clear evidence from Australian data that 
governance structures limit dysfunctional reporting of earnings (Davidson et al. 2005; Koh et 
al. 2007), little is known about the effect of governance structures on the quality of reported 
earnings more generally. This is a consequence of the focus that prior studies have given to 
earnings management as the variable of interest. The recent development of alternative 
measures of earnings quality has provided the opportunity for a broader examination of the 
effects of governance structures on a company’s information environment. This paper 
contributes to the existing literature by providing analysis of how governance structures 
mitigate the effects of environmental uncertainty and management discretion on the quality of 
reported earnings. 
 
We present analysis of the relation between governance structures and company information 
environment based on the measure of earnings quality developed by Dechow and Dichev 
(DD) (2002). This approach to determining earnings quality is based on assessing how well 
working capital accruals map into realised cash flows. It directly measures the extent to 
which accruals reflect actual cash flows to determine the quality of accrual earnings 
information. Dechow and Dichev (2002) empirically determined accrual quality as the 
standard deviation of the residual of a regression of current period accruals (measured as the 
change in working capital) on past, current and future operating cash flows.  
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The DD model for determining earnings quality represents a quite different approach to that 
used extensively in the prior literature, that is, the Jones (1991) model and its variants1. 
Francis et al. (2005) noted the DD approach overcomes a key criticism of the Jones model - 
that it measures accrual quality in an indirect manner. They comment that the ‘modified 
Jones model identifies accruals as abnormal if they are not explained by a limited set of 
fundamentals (PPE and changes in revenue), and while we believe that such abnormal 
accruals contain a substantial amount of uncertainty, the link to information risk is less direct 
than in the DD approach.’ Schipper and Vincent (2003) also noted that the DD measure does 
not require assumptions about unmanaged accounting fundamentals as is the case with the 
Jones (1991) model. A similar view was expressed by Aboody et al. (2005, p.653) that the 
DD measure ‘is a relatively more direct measure of a firm’s information environment derived 
from fundamental accounting data contained in its financial statements.’ 
 
A further advantage of the DD model is that it is not limited to identifying the effects of 
intentional earnings management on earnings quality. For the DD model, the source of the 
accrual estimation error is irrelevant. Francis et al. (2005, p.302) pointed out that accrual 
estimation errors can result from intentional earnings management, or that they can be an 
unintended consequence of management lapses and environmental uncertainty. They noted 
that the DD model ‘is predicated on the idea that, regardless of management intent, accruals 
quality is affected by the measurement error in accruals.’ Therefore, the DD measure of 
accrual quality captures the effect on accrual estimation error of both innate firm 
characteristics and earnings management.  
 
Francis et al. (2005) showed that the DD measure of accruals quality can be separated into its 
                                                 
1 See, for example, the widely used ‘modified Jones model’ developed by Dechow  (1995). 
 4
innate and discretionary components. The innate accruals quality component is dependent on 
a firm’s business model and operating environment, whereas the discretionary component is 
related to earnings management. The key contribution of this study is that we empirically 
examine the association between corporate governance structures on both the innate and the 
discretionary components of accrual quality. This is a significant extension of the existing 
literature which has focused on the effect of governance structures on the effects of 
management discretion associated with earnings. This study is valuable in that it provides a 
broader assessment of the effects of corporate governance measures on the information risk 
associated with earnings information.  
 
We follow the approach outlined in Frances et al. (2005) to empirically distinguish the innate 
and discretionary accruals quality. This involves regressing a firm’s accrual quality 
determined by the DD model on innate firm characteristics. The predicted value from this 
regression represents an estimate of the innate component of the firm’s accruals, while the 
regression residual is an estimate of the discretionary component. The innate characteristics 
used in the analysis are those suggested by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Frances et al. 
(2005) as having an impact on accrual quality. 
 
A further contribution of this paper is a development of the DD model which refines the 
measure of accrual quality. McNicols (2002, p.67) showed that cash from operations is a 
noisy proxy for the cash flows recognised in working capital accruals. To overcome this, our 
accrual quality regressions use targeted components of operating cash flows. The opportunity 
to refine the cash flow measure arises from the requirement under ‘AASB 127 Statement of 
Cash Flows’ that Australian companies apply the ‘direct’ method for presentation of 
operating cash flows. Our view is that the accrual estimation errors derived from our adjusted 
 5
model provides a less noisy measure of accrual quality. 
 
The results of analyses presented show that sound governance structures have a positive 
relation between the innate and discretionary components of accrual quality. Interestingly, we 
find the relation between sound governance structures and accrual quality is stronger for 
innate than discretionary accruals. This suggests that sound governance is more important in 
reducing environmental uncertainty and associated unintentional accrual estimation errors 
than in constraining discretionary earnings management.  
 
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review related literature and develop a 
general proposition that is tested by our empirical analysis. The third section explains our 
research method, including sample selection and measurement of variables. The fourth 
section reports and discusses the results of the study. In the final section some conclusions are 
drawn, the limitations of the study are acknowledged, and opportunities for further research 
are noted.  
 
2. Literature Review and Proposition 
2.1 Accrual Quality Literature 
Several prior studies have highlighted the relevance of the DD model as the basis for an 
empirical measure of the quality of a firm’s overall information environment. While these 
studies are not all specifically relevant to the research question in this paper, they do provide 
evidence of the usefulness of the empirical measure provided by the DD model. Accordingly, 
the following section presents a brief review of this literature. 
 
Investment decision research has focused on empirical examination of a theoretical model 
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developed by Lambert et al. (2005) of the relation between quality of accounting information 
and a firm’s cost of capital. The Lambert et al. (2005) model showed that poor quality 
information is related to coordination between firms and investors with respect to capital 
investment decisions and results in increased cost of capital. Francis et al. (2005) examined 
the relation between accrual quality and costs of debt and equity. They found that investors 
price securities in a manner that reflects awareness of accrual quality and, as a result, poorer 
accrual quality is associated with higher costs of debt and equity. Biddle and Hilary (2006) 
reported that accrual quality relates to firm level capital efficiency because of information 
asymmetry. In relation to capital markets, Chen et al. (2007) showed that accrual quality is a 
priced information risk factor in a dividend change setting. Their empirical results suggested 
that the market’s perception of information risk changes around dividend changes. An 
associated study was conducted by Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) who examined whether a 
variety of governance attributes explain firm credit ratings. Their study incorporated the DD 
accrual quality measure as a proxy for the degree of a firm’s financial transparency, a 
desirable governance characteristic. Their empirical analysis showed that the accrual quality 
measure was significant and positively associated with a firm’s credit rating.  
 
Doyle et al. (2007) examined the relation between accruals quality and internal control 
quality for a sample of US firms. Internal control quality was determined by whether sample 
firms disclosed a material weakness in internal control under the requirements of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Their general finding was that firms with weak internal control over 
financial reporting, as indicated by disclosure of a material weakness, had lower accruals 
quality. Doyle et al. (2007) also examined the effect of the potential severity of internal 
control weaknesses. They classified disclosed weakness as ‘account-specific’, that is 
weakness in control over specific account balances or transaction-level processes, or 
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‘company-level’ weakness where the disclosure indicated a fundamental problem with the 
firm’s control environment. The results showed that ‘company level’ weaknesses had a 
greater negative impact on accrual quality. This finding was explained by the account-
specific weaknesses being ‘auditable’ and therefore representing less of a threat to the 
reliability of the financial statements. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) extended this study by 
considering whether disclosed remediation of disclosed material weakness with internal 
controls was associated with improved accrual quality. The results suggested that firms which 
remediate disclosed material weakness, as indicated by a later unqualified audit report, 
exhibited significant improvements in accrual quality relative to firms that failed to remediate 
their control problems. 
 
A recent study by Srinidhi and Gul (2007) examined the link between accrual quality and 
audit quality as indicated by auditor independence. Their results showed that accrual quality 
had a significant negative association with the magnitude of non-audit fees and the ratio of 
non-audit fees to audit fees, but a significant positive association with audit fees. The results 
were consistent with the proposition that higher audit fees were indicative of greater ‘audit 
effort’ which resulted in better judgments about matters related to the reporting of accruals. 
Moreover, non-audit fees resulted in economic bonding and a loss of audit quality which 
allowed managers to use accruals in an opportunistic manner. 
 
2.2 Governance Structures and Accrual Quality 
Prior studies have shown that the quality of accruals and associated accrual estimation errors 
are affected by opportunistic earnings management and estimation problems that arise from 
environmental uncertainty (Francis et al., 2005, p.302; Dechow and Dichev, 2002). The focus 
of this study is the extent to which governance structures mitigate the effects of each of these 
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sources of error in the estimation of accruals.  
 
According to Dechow (1994, p.5) earnings management that occurs by managers exercising 
their accrual estimation discretion can result from their intention to ‘signal their private 
information or to opportunistically manipulate earnings.’ When managers manipulate 
accruals, there is a greater likelihood that the accruals do not estimate realised cash flows, 
with a corresponding decrease in accrual quality. Prior studies suggest that the monitoring 
effect of corporate governance structures limits the incidence of earnings management (Klein 
2002; Davidson et al., 2005; Koh et al., 2007). Therefore, we expect that sound governance 
structures are associated with higher accrual quality to the extent that they limit opportunistic 
accrual estimation activities by managers. 
 
We expect sound governance structures to have a similar positive effect to accrual estimation 
errors that result from environmental uncertainty. Doyle et-al (2007) and Ashbaugh-Skaife 
(2007) demonstrated a positive relation between the quality of a firm’s internal controls and 
accrual quality. Similarly, Beekes and Brown (2006) provided empirical evidence that better-
governed firms make more informative disclosures. These studies show the importance of 
internal controls in assisting managers make reliable estimations of accrual amounts. Weaker 
controls lead to greater environmental uncertainty for managers. This, in turn, increases the 
likelihood of unintentional accrual estimation errors, and result in noisy and less reliable 
financial information. A key role of corporate governance is to provide controls that ensure 
compliance with mandated financial reporting requirements and to ensure financial 
statements present fairly the financial affairs of the company (Davidson et al. 2005; Dechow 
et al. 1995). Because sound governance structures enhance a firm’s overall internal controls, 
we expect they are associated with higher accrual quality. 
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It is expected that sound governance structures mitigate intentional and unintentional accrual 
estimation errors. The following hypothesis is therefore tested in this paper: 
 
H1: Companies with sound corporate governance structures have more accurate accrual 
estimation than those without sound corporate governance structures. 
 
2.3 Governance Structures 
Important to this study is determining which governance structures are likely to improve 
accrual quality. The extant earnings management literature is drawn upon to determine the 
relevant governance structures and how their characteristics are likely to relate to accrual 
quality. It is reasonable to conclude that governance characteristics and associated internal 
controls that affect intentional earnings management are also relevant to unintentional accrual 
estimation errors. Davidson et al. (2005) provided an extensive review of prior studies related 
to controls provided by governance structures and earnings management. Their review 
concluded that the board of directors, the audit committee, and the external audit function 
were the relevant key structures.  
 
In relation to the board, the characteristic of independence has been shown to be critical to 
successful operation. Several studies have demonstrated that board independence is 
associated with better quality financial reporting (Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996; 
Peasnell et al., 2000). This was confirmed in the Australian context by Davidson et al., (2005) 
and Koh et al., (2007) who reported a significant negative relationship between earnings 
management and board independence. Board activity has also been shown to have a positive 
relation with its effectiveness (Yatim et al., 2006; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Conger et al., 
1998; Vafeas, 1999). 
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There is substantial prior research which points to the critical role that the audit committee 
plays in relation to the quality of financial reporting. Davidson et al. (2005, p.245) note that 
the specialised monitoring role of company’s audit committee ‘is likely to provide 
shareholders with the greatest protection in maintaining the credibility of a firm’s financial 
statements.’ Various characteristics of the audit committee have been shown to have an 
impact on its effectiveness. These include the key characteristic of independence (Jiambalvo, 
1996; McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996; Wright, 1996); competence indicated by 
accounting and financial expertise (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; Knapp 1987; Cohen et al., 
2002); diligence in discharging their responsibilities (Farber, 2005; Collier, 1993; Hughes, 
1999; Xie et al., 2001; McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996); and size which affects authority 
(Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993; Braiotta, 2000; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). Davidson et al., 
(2005) reported an association between a reduction in earnings management and audit 
committee independence indicated by the committee being comprised of a majority of non-
executives. The study by Koh et al. (2007) also demonstrated that audit committee 
independence and activity tended to moderate discretionary reporting behaviour.  
 
Prior studies related to the role of the external auditor have suggested that the size of the audit 
firm impacts on its effectiveness. Larger audit firms have been shown to provide better 
quality audit services and monitoring (DeAngelo, 1981; Francis et al., 1999; Kim et al., 2003). 
The audit firm size measure has generally been whether a firm is one of the recognised large 
audit firms.2  No support has been found for the effect of external auditor size in prior 
Australian studies (Davidson et al., 2005). 
 
Consistent with the prior literature, this study considers the effect of governance variables 
                                                 
2 Generally referred to as ‘Big 5’ or ‘Big 4’ firms. 
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that measure: board effectiveness, independence, and activity; audit committee independence 
and activity; and, external auditor characteristics. 
 
3. Research Design 
The research design involved the development of multiple regression models to test the 
extent to which the variance in accrual quality for a sample of listed Australian public 
companies is explained by governance structures. 
 
3.1 Sample Selection 
The sample was comprised of Australian public companies listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange in 2004. Data was obtained for companies with a 30 June balance date in 2004 
from the Aspect DatAnalysis database. The preliminary sample of companies was then 
screened for data availability based on criteria designed to ensure the measure of the 
dependent variable accrual quality (AQ) was able to be calculated. Companies in the sample 
were also required to have an audit committee in their corporate governance structure. The 
final sample was comprised of 381 companies. 
 
3.2 Governance Variables 
This study focuses on various governance attributes that are likely to influence accrual 
quality as identified in the prior literature discussed in section 2.3 above. While several prior 
studies have developed composite governance measures3, our approach is to use separate 
measures. This enables assessment of the importance of individual governance measures on 
innate accrual quality. While some of the independent variables show a degree of correlation, 
it is not of a size that warrants concern regarding its effect on the multivariate analysis 
                                                 
3 See Beekes and Brown (2006) for an extensive recent review. 
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conducted. Data for the governance variables outlined below was collected for the financial 
year ending 2004. 
 
Board independence was measured by two variables. First, the proportion of non-executive 
directors to total directors; and, second, a dummy variable indicating whether the roles of the 
chairperson and CEO are separate. Board diligence was measured by the number of board 
meetings per year.  
 
Selected audit committee variables included measures of independence, expertise and 
diligence and size. Independence was measured as the proportion of committee members that 
are described as non-executive. Expertise of committee members was determined by reading 
the financial reports and identifying formal qualifications in accounting and finance of 
members (for example, B.Com., FCA, CPA). The proportion of committee members with 
qualifications was included as a proxy for expertise.  Diligence was measured by the number 
of audit committee meetings held during the year. Finally, audit committee size was 
measured as the number of directors assigned to the audit committee.   
 
Consistent with the approach taken in prior studies, the external auditor size variable was 
determined by classifying audit firms as large or small. A dummy variable was used to 
identify companies that have utilised the audit services of one of the large audit firms. Large 
firms are usually limited to the so called ‘Big Four’, however, there are some mid-tier 
international firms that audit large numbers of listed companies in Australia. Therefore, we 
included in our definition of large firms, the two largest mid-tier firms (BDO and PKF).4 
                                                 
4 These were the two largest mid-tier audit firms as measured by revenue earned and number 
of audits of listed companies.  
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3.3 Accrual Quality Measure 
The DD approach to determining accrual quality is developed from the observation that 
accruals shift or adjust the recognition of cash flows over time. The advantage of accrual 
based earnings is that they better represent underlying economic achievements and sacrifices. 
However, they require estimates to be made and are subject to the exercise of managerial 
discretion. As Dechow and Dichev (2002) observed, the ‘benefit of using accruals comes at 
the cost of including estimation errors in reported earnings’. Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
show that the estimation error for working capital accruals can be measured by the residuals 
from firm specific regressions of changes in working capital on prior year, present year, and 
one-year ahead operating cash flows. Dechow and Dichev (2002) focused on working capital 
accruals and operating cash flows because the cash flow realisation of these accruals 
generally occurs within a year. They developed the following firm-level time-series 
regression to empirically determine accrual quality: 
 
∆WC = β0 + β1*CFOt-1 + β2*CFOt + β3*CFOt+1 + εt  (1) 
 
The regression residual or error term provides the measure of accrual quality; it represents the 
portion of accruals that does not closely estimate actual cash flows. Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) showed that the standard deviation of the residual is an appropriate measure of accrual 
quality: a higher standard deviation signifies greater accrual estimation error and lower 
quality. Moreover, they show that when calculating accrual quality at the firm-year level, the 
absolute value of the residual for that year is also an appropriate measure of accrual quality. 
 
The DD accrual quality measure is an attractive alternative to the previously widely used 
approach to determining discretionary accrual measure developed by Jones (1991) and 
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enhanced by Dechow et al. (1995). An important advantage of the DD model according to 
Francis et al. (2005) is that it provides a more direct link to information risk associated with 
earnings information. In consideration of this advantage of the DD method, we adopt a 
similar measure as a proxy for information risk in our empirical analysis.  
 
We make minor adjustments to the DD model in an effort to refine the measure of accrual 
quality. McNicols (2002, p.67), in assessing the DD model, found that the regression residual 
was strongly correlated with change in sales. This indicated that cash from operations was a 
noisy proxy for the cash flows that result from the reported accruals. To overcome this model 
misspecification, our accrual quality regressions use targeted components of operating cash 
flows; that is, we include only ‘cash receipts from customers’ (CRC) and ‘cash payments to 
suppliers and employees’ (CPSE). The opportunity to make this adjustment arises from the 
requirement under AASB 127 Statement of Cash Flows that Australian companies apply the 
‘direct’ method for presentation of operating cash flows, thereby providing more detailed 
cash flow information. Moreover, we use working capital accounts in our accrual calculation 
that would be most likely to estimate the cash flow components selected. These include: 
accounts receivable, accounts payable, provisions, and inventory. Consistent with Dechow 
and Dichev (2002), all variables are scaled by average total assets. The model used is 
represented in equation (2) below: 
 
∆WC = β0 + β1*[CRC + CPSE]t-1 + β2*[CRC + CPSE]t + β3*[CRC + CPSE]t+1 + εt  (2) 
       TA t-1         TA t      TA t+1 
 
Company specific regressions were conducted for five years, from 2001 to 2005. The AQ 
measure for each company was determined as the standard deviation of the residual for the 
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company over the five years. 
 
3.4 Innate and Discretionary Components of Accrual Quality 
The approach of Francis et al. (2005) of separating accruals quality into innate and 
discretionary accruals involves a regression of the DD accrual quality measure on selected 
factors that represent a firm’s innate characteristics. The selected innate characteristics follow 
Dechow and Dichev (2002), who showed that negative earnings, volatility in sales and 
operating cash flows, length of operating cycle, and company size affect accrual quality. The 
following regression was calculated: 
 
 AQt = α + β1*SIZEt + β2*LOSS +  β3*OPCYC + β4*SDOR + εt  (3) 
 
Table 1 provides a full explanation of variables included in this regression. The predicted 
values from the regression provide an estimate of innate accrual quality (IAQ), and the 
residual values provide an estimate of discretionary accrual quality (DAQ). The estimates of 
the components of accrual quality derived from equation (3) were subsequently regressed on 
selected corporate governance variables. 
 
3.5 Governance Regression Models 
A further regression was used to test our proposition regarding the relation between accrual 
quality and corporate governance structures. The dependent variables are innate accrual 
quality (IAQ) and discretionary accrual quality (DAQ) determined according to equation (3) 
above. Equation (4) represents the regression models: 
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IAQ = α +  β1*PROIND +β2*DUAL + β3*MEETBD + β4*AUDITOR + β5*NDIRAC + 
β6*PRONEDAC + β7*MEETAC + β8*PROEXP  (4) 
 
DAQ = α + β1*PROIND +β2*DUAL + β3*MEETBD + β4*AUDITOR + β5*NDIRAC + 
β6*PRONEDAC + β7*MEETAC + β8*PROEXP  (5) 
 
 
A summary of independent variables included in the regression models is provided in Table 1. 
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for variables included in the models. Descriptives for 
the sample companies’ innate characteristics show the mean asset size was $635 million. The 
average operating cycle was 62 days, and the standard deviation of operating revenue was 
0.223. A minority (38 percent) of companies reported a net loss after tax in 2004.  
 
The descriptive statistics for board characteristics vary across the sample companies. 
Generally, the data indicates that boards were structured to promote independence, and that 
board activities were conducted diligently. The average proportion of independent directors 
was substantial at 52 percent. Only 12 percent of companies in the sample had a joint CEO 
and board chair. The range in the number of board meetings per year was from a minimum of 
1 to a maximum of 34, with a median value of 11. In relation to external audit, 75 percent of 
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the sample companies utilised the services of one of the ‘Big 4 +2’ audit firms.    
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
Audit committee size ranged from 1 to 7 with a median of 3. On average, 51 percent of audit 
committee members had experience in accounting and finance expertise. The frequency of 
audit committee meetings ranged from 0 to 16 per year, with a median of 3 per year. Audit 
committee independence was favourable, with 88 percent of members being non-executive 
directors. 
 
Table 3 reports appropriate correlation measures for all independent variables included in the 
regression analyses. The highest correlation for the corporate governance variables is 
between the proportion of independent board directors (PROIND) and the proportion of non-
executive directors on the audit committee (r = .301). None of the correlations between 
variables were of sufficient magnitude to raise concerns about multicollinearity for the 
regression analyses (Tabachnick and Fidell 1996). 
 
(Table 3 about here) 
4.2 Accrual Quality Measure 
Accrual quality was determined for companies in the sample over the years 2001 to 2005 by 
means of regression analysis that followed the DD accrual quality model (see section 3.3). 
Recall that the DD model was modified to minimise possible model misspecification. This 
involved using the targeted components of operating cash flows as set out in Equation (2) 
above. Table 4 reports the results of these annual regressions. In order to examine whether 
the use of targeted cash flow components improved the model specification, comparative 
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results are also provided for DD model regressions. Based on comparison of the values of R2, 
the use of targeted cash flows markedly improved the model specification. This result 
suggests successful mitigation of the noise that arises from using total cash from operations 
as a proxy for the cash flows that result from the reported accruals. 
 
In contrast to all other years, the AQ regression for 2001 was not significant. This raised 
concerns about including the AQ data for this year in the subsequent analyses. This concern 
was addressed by running subsequent analysis with and without the 2001 AQ data. Overall, 
the results of the analyses did not differ, and the reported results include all years from 2001 
to 2005.  
 
The residual for regressions over each of the years from 2001 to 2005 provided the measure 
of AQ. The standard deviation of these residuals was used as the overall measure of accrual 
quality. 
 
4.3 Innate and Discretionary Accrual Quality 
The method devised by Francis et al. (2005) is used to empirically determine innate and 
discretionary accrual quality (see section 3.4 above). This required a regression of the 
calculated overall AQ measure against innate firm characteristics as outlined in equation (3) 
above. Results of this regression are reported in Table 5.  
 
The results show that company size and volatility in operating revenue were significant. The 
sign of the coefficients on the significant variables indicates that larger companies have 
higher AQ, and firms with more volatile operating revenues have lower AQ. This is 
consistent with the earlier findings by Dechow and Dichev (2002). 
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4.4 Governance Structures and Accrual Quality 
4.4.1 Innate Accrual Quality 
The regression of governance characteristics on innate accrual quality was significant at         
p <.01 (F=13.577). The results (displayed in Table 6) suggest that the characteristics of the 
board, the audit committee, and the external auditor significantly explain the level of innate 
accrual quality.  
 
(Table  6 about here) 
 
In relation to board characteristics, the indicator variable for companies with a dual CEO and 
board chair (DUAL), and the number of board meetings (MEETBD) were significant at 
p<.05. As expected, when the dual CEO and chair role occurred, the predicted AQ measure 
was greater which indicates lower accrual quality. Contrary to expectations, a greater number 
of board meetings were also associated with lower accrual quality. However, the size of the 
coefficient on this variable suggests its economic significance is insubstantial. The size of the 
external auditor was significant at p<.01. Companies that used the services of the ‘Big 4 plus 
2’ audit firms had higher accrual quality. Of the variables that operationalised audit 
committee characteristics, committee size (NDIRAC), proportion of non executive directors 
assigned to the committee (PRONEDAC), and number of meetings (MEETAC) were 
significant.  The sign of all of the audit committee variables were consistent with 
expectations. Larger audit committees, a greater proportion of non executive directors 
assigned to the committee, and more frequent committee meetings were associated with 
higher accrual quality. 
 
Overall, the results provided support for the proposition that sound governance structures are 
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positively related to innate accrual quality. These findings are generally consistent with prior 
studies that have demonstrated a positive relation between internal controls and overall 
quality of financial reporting. 
 
4.4.2 Discretionary Accrual Quality 
The regressions of governance characteristics on discretionary AQ showed that a small 
proportion of the variance in DAQ is explained by the selected governance characteristics 
(R2=0.055). The regression (see Table 6) was significant at p=.007. Results show that the 
only significant variables were the size of the audit committee (NDIRAC) and the number of 
audit committee meetings held (NOMEETAC). The sign of these audit committee variables 
were consistent with expectations, that is, larger audit committees and more frequent 
committee meetings were associated with higher accrual quality. 
 
The results of this analysis are inconsistent with the earlier studies that have used Australian 
data (Davidson et al., 2005; Koh et al., 2007). Both of these prior studies reported that board 
independence was associated with lower levels of earnings management. In contrast, we find 
no evidence of a similar effect for either of the board independence variables included in our 
analysis. Davidson et al. (2005) and Koh et al. (2007) reported that audit committee 
independence was associated with lower levels of earnings management. Koh et al. (2007) 
also reported the number of audit committee meetings was associated with lower earnings 
management. While our results also suggest that the audit committee serves to maintain 
reported earnings quality by minimising discretionary accruals, we find different audit 
committee characteristics to be important. 
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5.0 Conclusion 
The empirical analysis presented in this paper provides a useful insight into the important 
issue of how corporate governance structures affect the quality of reported company earnings. 
This study uses the empirical model of accrual quality developed by Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) which, by determining how well estimated accruals reflect actual cash flows, provides 
a direct measure of earnings quality. The model provides a useful metric for determining the 
information risk in earnings numbers. 
 
We develop a modified version of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model to determine accrual 
quality. This measure of accrual quality is separated into components attributable to innate 
firm characteristics and management discretion. These components of accrual quality were 
then used as the dependent variables in regressions against various corporate governance 
characteristics.  
 
The results of our analysis suggest that the relation between sound governance structures and 
accrual quality is stronger for innate than discretionary accruals. This finding suggests that 
the consequences of sound governance extend beyond mitigating dysfunctional management 
reporting. The results are consistent with the view that sound governance and associated 
internal controls reduce environmental uncertainty for managers and reduce the likelihood of 
unintentional accrual estimation errors. This leads to less noisy and more reliable earnings 
information. In relation to innate accruals, board and audit committee independence, larger 
audit committees, and diligence of the audit committee all related positively to accrual quality. 
 
Analysis related to discretionary accruals provided interesting results. Audit committee size 
and diligence of the committee were the only significant governance characteristics. 
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Companies with larger audit committees and those with audit committees that met more 
frequently were associated with higher accrual quality. These results are inconsistent with 
prior Australian studies. An obvious explanation is the different method used to determine the 
effects of managerial discretion on reported earnings; prior studies have used the Jones model 
approach. The modified version of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) approach utilised in this 
study is likely to provide a less noisy measure of earnings management. Comparison of these 
methods may provide ongoing research opportunities, as well as further development of 
development and refinement of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) approach to measuring 
accrual quality. 
 
There are several limitations to this study. First, the measure of earnings quality is limited to 
considering how well current accruals estimate operating cash flows. This approach has been 
shown to be a suitable proxy for accrual quality; however, it does not provide a complete 
analysis of earnings quality. This necessarily excludes some components of reported earnings 
that are not associated with current accruals. Second, the results of the analysis are subject to 
the effectiveness of the measures adopted to operationalise various characteristics of 
corporate governance structures. 
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Table 1: Variables in Analyses 
 
 Variable Measure Descriptor 
Innate 
Characteristics 
   
 Company size Natural log of total assets SIZE 
 Negative earnings Dummy variable - coded 1 if 
negative net profit after tax 
reported in 2004, 0 otherwise 
LOSS 
 Operating Cycle Natural log of average days 
inventory and days receivable 
for 2003 and 2004 
OPCYC 
 Volatility Windsorised standard 
deviation of operating revenue 
for 2003 to 2005   
SDOR 
Board 
Characteristics 
   
Independence Proportion of independent directors Number of independent 
directors/ number of directors 
PROIND 
Independence Dual CEO and board chair Dummy variable - coded 1 if 
CEO is chair of board of 
directors, 0 otherwise 
DUAL 
Diligence Number of board meetings each year  MEETBD 
External Audit 
Characteristics 
   
Auditor Existence of Big 4 + 2 auditor Dummy variable - coded 1 if 
appointed auditor is one of the 
Big 4 + 2 firms 
AUDITOR 
Audit Committee 
Characteristics 
   
Size Number of directors on the audit 
committee 
 NDIRAC 
Independence Proportion of non-executive directors 
on the audit committee 
 PRONEDAC 
Diligence Number of audit committee meetings 
each year 
 MEETAC 
Expertise Proportion of audit committee members 
that have accounting and finance 
qualifications 
Number of audit committee 
members with 
qualifications/number of 
committee members 
PROEXP 
 24
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
n =381 
Panel A: Continuous Variables 
AQ      
IAQ      
DAQ      
Total Assets (000’s) 635 775 3 083 487 710 44 284 45 259 109 
SIZE 17.837 2.044 13.490 17.606 24.540 
Average Op. Cycle 62.140 102.630 0.260 39.679 1462.870 
OPCYC 3.622 1.015 0.000 3.681 7.290 
SDOR 0.223 0.256 0.000 0.125 1.000 
PROIND 0.521 0.232 0.000 0.500 1.000 
MEETBD 11.120 4.604 1 11 34 
NDIRAC 2.910 0.830 1 3 7 
PRONEDAC 0.877 0.220 0.000 1.000 1.000 
MEETAC 3.350 1.868 0 3 16 
PROEXP 0.505 0.320 0.000 0.500 1.000 
 
Panel B: Dummy Variables 
 Firms Percentage 
LOSS 203 38.2 
DUAL 66 12.4 
AUDITOR 399 75.0 
Where: 
SIZE = Natural log of total assets 
LOSS = Dummy variable - coded 1 if negative net profit after tax reported in 2004, 0 otherwise 
OPCYC = Natural log of average days inventory and days receivable for 2003 and 2004 
SDOR = Windsorised standard deviation of operating revenue for 2003 to 2005 
PROIND = Number of independent directors/ number of directors 
DUAL = Dummy variable - coded 1 if CEO is chair of board of directors, 0 otherwise 
MEETBD = Number of board meetings each year 
AUDITOR = Dummy variable - coded 1 if appointed auditor is one of the Big 4 + 2 firms 
NDIRAC = Number of directors on the audit committee 
PRONEDAC = Proportion of non-executive directors on the audit committee 
MEETAC = Number of audit committee meetings each year 
PROEXP = Number of audit committee members with qualifications/number of committee members 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrices for Independent Variables 
 
Panel A: Innate Characteristics 
 SIZE LOSS SDOR OPCYC     
SIZE 1        
LOSS -0.496 1       
OPCYC -0.039 -0.017 1      
SDOR -0.244  0.128 -0.160 1     
 
Panel B: Governance Variables 
 PROIND DUAL MEETBD AUDITOR NDIRAC PRONEDAC MEETAC PROEXP
PROIND 1        
DUAL -0.071 1       
MEETBD 0.051 -0.106 1      
AUDITOR 0.145 -0.148 0.051 1     
NDIRAC 0.104 -0.118 0.050 0.137 1    
PRONEDAC 0.301 -0.120 0.061 0.214 -0.056 1   
MEETAC 0.198 0.003 0.071 0.136 0.178 0.176 1  
PROEXP -0.020 -0.021 0.045 0.009 -0.146 0.116 0.035 1 
  * Denotes significant at p<.05 
  ** Denotes significant at p<.01 
Where: 
SIZE = Natural log of total assets 
LOSS = Dummy variable - coded 1 if negative net profit after tax reported in 2004, 0 otherwise 
OPCYC = Natural log of average days inventory and days receivable for 2003 and 2004 
SDOR = Windsorised standard deviation of operating revenue for 2003 to 2005 
PROIND = Number of independent directors/ number of directors 
DUAL = Dummy variable - coded 1 if CEO is chair of board of directors, 0 otherwise 
MEETBD = Number of board meetings each year 
AUDITOR = Dummy variable - coded 1 if appointed auditor is one of the Big 4 + 2 firms 
NDIRAC = Number of directors on the audit committee 
PRONEDAC = Proportion of non-executive directors on the audit committee 
MEETAC = Number of audit committee meetings each year 
PROEXP = Number of audit committee members with qualifications/number of committee members 
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Table 4: Regression Results - Annual Accrual Quality 
 
 Modified DD Model DD Model 
Year R2  β F Value R2  β F Value 
Pooled Years 
(2001 -2005) 
        
2001 0.005 β1 
β2 
β3  
  0.001 
-0.085 
  0.013
1.111 0.002 β1 
β2 
β3 
  0.067 
-0.015 
  0.007 
0.369 
2002 0.354 β1 
β2 
β3 
-0.231 
  0.432 
-0.066 
126.229** 0.146 β1 
β2 
β3 
  0.584 
-0.095 
-0.080 
38.616** 
2003 0.404 β1 
β2 
β3 
  0.114 
-0.658 
  0.020
47.766** 0.194 β1 
β2 
β3 
-0.823 
-0.078 
  0.214 
57.548** 
2004 0.758 β1 
β2 
β3 
  0.801 
-1.359 
  0.014
768.921** 0.019 β1 
β2 
β3 
-0.052 
-1.922 
  1.494 
4.930** 
2005 0.682 β1 
β2 
β3 
  0.027 
-0.355 
  0.002
528.043** 0.001 β1 
β2 
β3 
  0.084 
-0.053 
  0.013 
0.120 
** Denotes significant at p<.01 
 27
Table 5: Regression Results - Innate Characteristics 
 
 Modified DD Model 
- Standard Deviation 
of 5 Years Residual 
DD Model 
- Standard Deviation 
of 5 Years Residual 
Modified DD Model 
- Average of Absolute 5 
Years Residual 
Variable β t statistic 
(p value) 
β t statistic 
(p value) 
β t statistic 
(p value) 
INTERCEPT 0.694  0.699  0.504  
SIZE -0.027 -5.230** 
(0.000) 
-0.030 -6.555** 
(0.000) 
-0.020 -4.595** 
(0.000) 
LOSS 0.013 0.603 
(0.547) 
0.035 1.822 
(0.069) 
0.020 1.108 
(0.268) 
OPCYC -0.012 -1.381 
(0.168) 
-0.005 -0.594 
(0.553) 
-0.006 -0.840 
(0.401) 
SDOR 0.178 4.834** 
(0.000) 
0.155 4.694** 
(0.000) 
0.152 5.109** 
(0.000) 
 
Model 
      
R2 0.144  0.197  0.133  
Adj. R2 0.137  0.191  0.127  
F Statistic 22.115**  32.083**  21.175**  
** Denotes significant at p<.01 
Where:  
SIZE = Natural log of total assets 
LOSS = Dummy variable - coded 1 if negative net profit after tax reported in 2004, 0 otherwise 
OPCYC = Natural log of average days inventory and days receivable for 2003 and 2004 
SDOR = Windsorised standard deviation of operating revenue for 2003 to 2005   
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Table 6: Regression Results – Governance Structures and Accrual Quality 
 
  Innate  
Accrual Quality 
Discretionary  
Accrual Quality 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
β t statistic β t statistic 
INTERCEPT 
 
 0.329  0.308  
PROIND - 0.013 0.746 
(0.228) 
-0.005 -0.117 
(0.449) 
DUAL + 0.025 2.001* 
(0.023) 
0.010 0.361 
(0.359) 
MEETBD - 0.001 1.645* 
(0.050) 
-0.001 -0.422 
(0.336) 
AUDITOR - -0.033 -3.695** 
(0.000) 
-0.006 -0.327 
(0.372) 
NDIRAC - -0.025 
 
-5.269** 
(0.000) 
-0.032 -3.209** 
(0.001) 
PRONEDAC - -0.036 
 
-2.000* 
(0.023) 
-0.043 -1.117 
(0.133) 
MEETAC - -0.010 
 
-4.801** 
(0.000) 
-0.007 -1.710* 
(0.044) 
PROEXP - -0.001 
 
-0.083 
(0.471) 
0.029 -1.161 
(0.125) 
Model      
R2  0.226  0.055  
Adj. R2  0.209  0.035  
F Statistic  13.581**  2.702**  
  n = 381  n = 381  
*Denotes significant at p<.05, **denotes significant at p<.01 (one-tail test for coefficients). 
Where: 
PROIND = Number of independent directors/ number of directors 
DUAL = Dummy variable - coded 1 if CEO is chair of board of directors, 0 otherwise 
MEETBD = Number of board meetings each year 
AUDITOR = Dummy variable - coded 1 if appointed auditor is one of the Big 4 + 2 firms 
NDIRAC = Number of directors on the audit committee 
PRONEDAC = Proportion of non-executive directors on the audit committee 
MEETAC = Number of audit committee meetings each year 
PROEXP = Number of audit committee members with qualifications/number of committee members 
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